Our global challenges require:

A United Nations Emergency Peace Service

to:

• Prevent armed conflict and protect vulnerable people;
• Respond rapidly and reliably before crises escalate;
• Provide prompt help to address human needs in complex emergencies;
• Encourage military build-down and wider disarmament;
• ‘Save succeeding generations’ and trillions of dollars to address our climate emergency, poverty reduction, sustainable development, and;
• Inspire people, political will and funding for the vital work of the UN.

A submission to:

The United Nations Agenda For Peace
By Dr H. Peter Langille
January, 12 2023

“This venture is of the greatest importance both to the UN as a responsible institution and to the millions as of yet unknown, innocent victims who might, in the future, be saved by this essential addition to the UN’s capacity to act on their behalf. There is one overwhelming argument for the United Nations Emergency Peace Service. It is desperately needed, and it is needed as soon as possible.” – (the late) Sir Brian Urquhart
The idea

With one development—a standing United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) – effectively a ‘UN 911 first responder’ – the Organization would finally have a rapid, reliable capacity to help fulfill four of its tougher assigned tasks. The proposed UNEPS was specifically designed to help prevent armed conflict and mass atrocity crimes, to protect civilians at extreme risk, to ensure prompt start-up of demanding peace operations, and to address human needs in complex emergencies where other actors either cannot or will not.

What’s more? This gender equitable service would raise standards system-wide. Equally important, as an ‘emergency security provider’, a UNEPS would be a game-changer for building the trust, confidence and cooperation required for military build-down and disarmament. Such a UN service has long been recognized as crucial to counter the anarchy in a self-help system, the security dilemma, and the fears of aggressive parties that continue to drive militarization.

The Challenges We Face

Global emergencies will soon be more intense and more frequent, affecting people everywhere. Last year’s ‘Code Red for Humanity’ was promptly followed by another warning of potential world conflict and chaos.

“The world is now facing the highest number of violent conflicts since 1945” according to UN Secretary-General António Guterres, who also cautions that, “We have no instruments to deal with crisis...we live in a dangerous situation.” One hundred million people have been forcibly displaced and, this year, over 339 million people will need humanitarian assistance and protection. Reports warn the climate crisis could displace 1.2 billion people by 2050. New extremes of weather and vast inequality will prompt desperate conditions, more insecurity and a higher incidence of violent conflict.

The ever-higher costs and risks of war are unsustainable. The cost of preparing for more war is now over $2-trillion annually, but that is dwarfed by the damage caused, with the Global Peace Index reporting the economic impact of violence at $16.5-trillion annually. That’s a yearly burden of nearly $2000 on everyone, everywhere -- absorbing resources urgently needed.

Last September, a ‘Global Census Poll’ found “widespread skepticism that the United Nations is well-prepared for the challenges of the next decade.” It’s not, although the UN system works surprising well on numerous global challenges.

UN peace operations remain the most vital, visible and widely-appreciated work of the Organization. They are justifiably credited with saving millions of lives, billions of dollars and stemming escalation of great-power confrontation. Numerous reports attest to the success of UN peacekeeping. Yet four longstanding challenges continue to jeopardize people and support for the Organization.

Although the UN Security Council retains primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the UN still lacks a dedicated
capacity to respond rapidly and reliably, to prevent armed conflict, to protect people and to provide security, care and help in complex emergencies.

Without a UN capacity to act, the world has witnessed humanitarian crises in Rwanda, Srebrenica, Libya, Syria, Sir Lanka, Yemen, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Tigray and the Ukraine. Despite the promise of "never again", mass atrocities occur again and again.

Former UN General Assembly President Mogens Lykketoft conceded, “the UN today remains insufficiently equipped to meet its overriding 1945 objective: to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”

Conflict prevention was elevated to ‘the top priority’ by Secretary-General, António Guterres, who acknowledged it as “the very reason the United Nations exists” and called for “urgent investments in all the tools of prevention”. Yet rather than provide the UN with adequate tools for prevention, governments world-wide continue to limit the options to early warning, mediation and cooperation with regional organizations. As a result, the UN has little capacity for preventive action and even less capacity for preventive deployment. As such, it cannot deter armed conflict. There have been too few, if any, tangible changes since the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change reported,

“The biggest source of inefficiency in our collective security institutions has simply been an unwillingness to get serious about preventing deadly violence. The failure to invest time and resources early in order to prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflicts leads to much larger and deadlier conflagrations that are much costlier to handle later.”

Protection of civilians at risk has been a priority in UN peace operations since 1999. World leaders also agreed on a fundamental responsibility to protect civilians at the 2005 World Summit. But national capitals and national armed forces remain reluctant to assume protection as a priority. The UN confronts a protection gap that shows few signs of fading, with dire consequences for millions of people now needing protection.

Although rapid deployment has been a priority for thirty years, UN response times have slowed. The current system requires 6-to-12 months or more to plan, attract national contributors, negotiate terms, find and rent equipment, arrange transport and deploy – which is why UN peace operations are often characterized as ‘too-little, too late’.

“The initiative for a United Nations Emergency Peace Service makes eminent sense as the UN is often hampered by its incapacity to respond rapidly to unfolding crises. This idea should now be pushed and supported widely.” – Jean-Marie Guéhenno, past President, the International Crisis Group, former UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations
Similarly problematic is the shift to ‘post-conflict stabilization, which doesn’t start until fighting stops. Rather than respond promptly to prevent situations deteriorating, conflicts tend to escalate and spread, then require latter, larger, longer operations at far higher costs.

The current system of UN peacekeeping is unlikely to inspire a wider constituency of support as longstanding problems stymie efforts at prevention, protection and providing prompt help. Such shortcomings undermine the public and political will to contribute finances, personnel and equipment.

With overlapping emergencies and trendlines suggesting a higher incidence of armed conflict, the UN Secretary-General is correct to note there will either be “a breakdown to worse” or “a breakthrough to better”.

“Sooner or later, we will have to have a global emergency service for ever-multiplying crises in the world – the sooner, the better.” – Mary Kaldor, CBE, Professor of Global Governance, Department of International Development, The London School of Economics and Political Science

What’s proposed?

A United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) would be a standing, first-responder to manage the initial six months of demanding operations. Ten core principles characterize this proposal. It is to be:

- A permanent standing, integrated UN formation;
- Highly trained and well-equipped;
- Ready for immediate deployment upon authorization of the Security Council;
- Multidimensional (civilians, police and military);
- Multifunctional (capable of diverse assignments with specialized skills for security, humanitarian, health and environmental crises);
- Composed of 13,500 dedicated personnel (recruited professionals, selected, trained and employed by the UN);
- Developed to ensure regional and gender equitable representation;
- Co-located at a designated UN base under an operational headquarters and two mobile mission headquarters;
- At sufficient strength to operate in high-threat environments; and,
- To complement existing UN arrangements, with a dedicated UN service to cover the initial six months until Member States can deploy, if needed.

This idea stems from the Government of Canada’s study, Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability For The United Nations. It was developed with the guidance of senior UN officials, military officers, peacekeepers and peacebuilders involved in multinational efforts, and subsequently refined in three books. The plans and composition are updated to ensure a sophisticated response to new developments and future requirements.
What are the benefits?

**First,** UN peace operations would improve with a standing first-responder. Instead of taking 6 months-to-a year or more to deploy national contingents, there would be immediate access to a dedicated UN service to address a wider array of emergencies.

Prevention and protection are far more manageable tasks when arriving promptly before conflicts escalate and spread into worse violence.

Any preventive system works best when it seldom has to intervene to stem crises. As with a police or defense effort, it’s best to be known to have credible means to deter aggression and, when required, the means to intervene to stop crimes. In practice, this usually works by having a legitimate capacity that is recognized and ready to respond as needed.

A standing UNEPS would convey a legitimate presence ready 24/7 to discourage violence. Its deployable elements should be sufficient to deter most, if not all belligerents, to operate in high-risk environments and to intervene if needed to stop aggressive parties.

Aside from a military formation to deter aggression and maintain security, there would be sufficient police to restore law and order, as well as civilian teams to provide essential services. Thus, a UNEPS would clearly be a more reliable and rapid first responder; one that could also serve as a vanguard, strategic reserve and a modest security guarantor, both to deter violent crime and respond, when necessary, to prevent conflict and protect civilians.

Unlike prior proposals, a UNEPS is both multidimensional and multifunctional, as well as one to complement existing UN arrangements. And, it will draw on volunteers recruited world-wide rather than national contingents to ensure rapid and reliable UN responses.

**Second,** as a new model, a UNEPS is to encourage a wider shift toward providing prompt care and help world-wide, with an array of useful services. In what’s increasingly a global neighborhood, there will be a greater need for legitimate, universal emergency services designed to convey support.

With its gender-equitable composition, there are better prospects for peacemaking and peacebuilding. Standards would improve system-wide.

As an integrated first-responder, a UNEPS is not limited to simply stopping direct violence, but also extends to initiating quick-impact and long-term projects. Combined with a focus on human needs, it should help to counter structural violence (exploitation and exclusion), and stem cultural violence. By including specialists in conflict resolution and mediation, human rights monitors and educators, peacebuilding advisory units, and medical teams, there is a far better prospect of stemming or solving a crisis.

A UNEPS is intended to deliver more assistance faster and in a more sophisticated manner. Small teams of experts and planners are included to coordinate the larger formations’ immediate and subsequent responses to security and humanitarian emergencies, disaster assistance, environmental
and health crisis. With its modular formation, UNEPS deployments can be tailored to various mission-specific requirements.

**While relatively small in size, this ‘ounce of prevention' would be worth a ton of cure.**

A UNEPS would inevitably entail major start-up and recurring costs. Given a full complement of 13,500 personnel, the start-up costs would be in the range of $3.5 billion (U.S.), with annual recurring costs of approximately $1.5 billion and, incremental costs for field operations of approximately $1.2 billion. These costs would likely be shared proportionally among 193 Member States as part of each nation’s assessed share of the UN regular budget.

A UNEPS would not only help to prevent the escalation of volatile conflicts and deter groups from armed violence; it could also drastically cut the size, the length and the frequency of UN operations. Even with success in just one of these areas, it should provide a substantive return on the investment. By comparison to the existing arrangements, a UN Emergency Peace Service would be far more cost-effective.

**Third,** equally important, the potential of a dedicated UN service capable of responding as an ‘emergency security provider’ has long been viewed as a prerequisite to a wider disarmament process; one that should free up resources for addressing other global challenges.

Increasingly, it's understood that progress on wider disarmament and a UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons depends on a coherent alternative to nuclear and conventional deterrence.

Similarly, the ‘security dilemma’ driving numerous states to arm-up in response to uncertainty over potentially aggressive neighbours can only be offset by a UN assurance of support.

In both instances above, the alternative need not be similar to what exists, large or powerfully destructive. It needs to be credible, respected and widely valued.

As an emergency security provider, the likely roles of a UNEPS would be similar to that of a ‘first-responder’, a trip-wire, a vanguard, and a standing presence to dissuade, deter and, respond rapidly if necessary. The minimal deterrent and modest military capacity within are appropriate and likely to be adequate.

In this capacity, a UNEPS does not require heavy military elements nor a capacity for mid-to-high-intensity war-fighting. In representing the international community, it’s unlikely to encounter violent resistance from any national armed force. If needed for augmentation and support, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council will continue to have ample capacity in the near term. But they should not be needed so much in the longer-term.

With a credible UN capacity to offset fears and to deter aggression, a UNEPS would provide an incentive for countries to scale back on preparing for more
war at ever-higher costs and risks. Governments would then have the
resources to address our climate emergency, poverty reduction and
sustainable development.

*As the world has learned time and again, the costs of ad hoc and
improvised responses to violence and disaster are enormous. Those
costs are measured both in lives and in treasure. Our global institutions
need the ever-ready capacity to preserve peace and mitigate human
suffering. Being prepared is the key. In this vein, creation of a UN
Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) deserves serious consideration as
an innovative addition to modern global governance approaches. – Keith
Porter, President, Stanley Center for Peace and Security*

**What’s noteworthy?**

The proposal for a UNEPS was agreed upon at an earlier global conference in
Cuenca, Spain, where participants from diverse sectors unanimously
confirmed the concept was more appealing than previous proposals, the case
more persuasive, and the model and plans were politically viable. Unlike a
force, army or legion, it is simply far tougher to oppose providing others with
legitimate emergency services.

This idea has since attracted an impressive list of **endorsements**, including
prominent UN officials, leaders of UN peace operations, peace, security and
conflict experts world-wide.

Two U.S. House Resolutions, *(H-Res 180 and H-Res 213)*, confirmed a
UNEPS as a viable policy option for “saving millions of lives and billions of
dollars”. In 2017, UNEPS became the peace **priority** of the British Labour
Party.

In announcing another **Agenda for Peace**, UN Secretary-General Antonio
Guterres accorded a similar emphasis to prevention and protection, reducing
violence and placing women at the center of security policies. Notably, the
**People’s Declaration of June 2020** explicitly called for more standing
capacities available on short-notice for UN peace operations. The earlier
pleas for ‘big and bold’ ideas have recently been followed by high-level calls
for a paradigm shift, with more ambitious proposals.

A UNEPS is one big idea for UN transformation; one to inspire wider support
for a more effective UN that might ‘save succeeding generations’ and one big
step toward a global peace system.

Clearly, international and great power cooperation will be required to develop
the proposed UNEPS. Yet the future, if there is to be one, will depend on far
deeper cooperation. Concerns over state sovereignty are likely to diminish as
Member States realize that they confront a survival imperative. Contrary to the
belief that this is a **hopeless time** for major changes, public concern and high-
level support for a more effective UN tends to arise only in the aftermath of
tragic wars and/or genocides.
The P-5 need viable policy options that provide a win-win solution to the world’s more pressing challenges. Is there a better way to renew their cooperation than in a big joint project such as the development of a UNEPS?

**Proposed recommendation for An Agenda for Peace**

Announce further inquiry into the proposed United Nations Emergency Peace Service. Ideally, this would entail two independent, in-depth studies to first identify the diverse requirements at the political, financial, strategic, operational and tactical levels, and: second, conduct a high-level, independent review into its feasibility, cost-effectiveness, potential advantages and limits.

Citing an interest in the idea will encourage a global constituency. Then, this idea has the potential to motivate and mobilize millions of people, which is a first step toward revitalizing wider support, political will and the required funding. Within two years, the development of a United Nations Emergency Peace Service is likely to be a widely recognized solution to increasingly evident problems. The changes proposed are overdue and urgent.

“The United Nations exists not merely to preserve the peace but also to make change - even radical change - possible without violent upheaval. The United Nations has no vested interest in the status quo. It seeks a more secure world, a better world, a world of progress for all peoples.” – Ralph J. Bunche, a drafter of the UN Charter, UN mediator and peacekeeper, and recipient of the 1950 Nobel Peace Prize
Brief elaboration on the core principles

A UNEPS would be a permanent standing, integrated UN formation

To prevent, manage and transform armed conflict will require that an array of sophisticated skills and well-integrated services are immediately available within a dedicated standing formation.

A UNEPS would be constituted for an indefinite period and remain either in training and preparation for deployment, engaged in a UN operation or in rest and recuperation following a deployment.

A standing service is the optimal means to consolidate, prepare and rapidly deploy essential services. It provides immediate access to highly-trained personnel within a central, mission-oriented, organizational structure. This should also help to streamline and expedite the long list of tasks that currently slow planning and delay deployment of operations.

A UNEPS will have to be highly trained and well equipped

Prior training for each of the service’s four primary roles and ancillary tasks, as well as contingencies, will be essential. All personnel must be provided with a common understanding of various UN operations and objectives, as well as with intensive preparation for their specific roles and responsibilities.

Appropriate, modern equipment must be acquired, pre-packed and prepared for immediate deployment. Similar equipment must also be available for training.

A UNEPS would be ready for immediate deployment upon authorization by the UN Security Council

A UNEPS is an instrument that expands the Security Council’s toolbox and options. In turn, the UN Security Council would have to agree on the development of a UNEPS and agree on its operational readiness for deployment.

Rapid deployment of a UNEPS presents an array of demanding requirements. Missing components, whether in personnel, supportive infrastructure or equipment, cause delays and lead to failures. Even the basic requirements include: an early warning mechanism, an effective decision-making process, readily available transportation and infrastructure, logistics support, adequate finances and well-trained personnel. Seven key components will demand sustained efforts:

- **first**, all deployable personnel, equipment and supplies must be adequately prepared for prompt staging. They will be expected to stand at a high degree of readiness for deployment at very short notice. As noted, prior comprehensive training of all personnel will be a prerequisite;
- **second**, all deployable elements will require a unique degree of self-sufficiency – a capacity to operate on their own for up to 30 days. Logistic
support must be built within the structure and ready for diverse conditions;

• third, prompt transportation to the mission area, as well as within the specific theatre of operations is essential. Strategic and tactical airlift, as well as sealift must be assured by prior arrangement;

• fourth, a high degree of mobility will be needed to respond rapidly over a large area. Deployed elements must be equipped for quick and secure movement. An array of vehicles will be required for protection, support and transportation;

• fifth, as deployments are to be of a strictly limited duration, there will be a need to ensure replacements or rotations within three- to six-months, as well as augmentation and reinforcement in the event of a serious escalation. A UNEPS must be capable of complementing other UN forces, ensuring sufficient interoperability with those that follow-on, replace or assist;

• sixth, flexibility is required at various levels given the relatively broad range of potential tasks and contingencies. No one size fits all: UN responses must be tailored to various mission-specific requirements. Accordingly, UNEPS is organized in a modular structure. UNEPS elements can be separated or combined. Such a structure expands the range of choice for selecting elements essential to a particular operation. The composition can be quickly customized according to the initial assessment of requirements. There are advantages in having elements that can operate on their own, independent of the entire capability. A modular structure allows for simultaneous deployment of military police or civilian elements to different operations should the need arise; and,

• seventh, since another objective is to develop a more sophisticated capability, contingency planning, doctrine and training must also ensure a higher degree of flexibility at the operational and tactical level.

In sum, a UNEPS is viewed as the optimum way to eliminate the time-gap between a UN Security Council mandate and the long period before the actual start of a mission. Rather than plan for deployment within three- to six-months, there would be the potential to send initial elements within days, lighter elements within the week, with concurrent staging for heavier units that would follow within weeks. The long list of tasks that delay operations would be consolidated and streamlined within a coherent organization.

A UNEPS will be a multidimensional service

A multidimensional UN Emergency Service – a UN ‘911’, composed of military, police and civilian volunteers – corresponds to the diverse operational requirements of contemporary, as well as future UN peace operations. A survey of the four primary roles and ancillary tasks also suggests that the requirements, particularly the deployable elements of a UNEPS must include a combination of military, police and civilian elements. No armed force can provide the range of required services. No police or civilian elements can safely manage rapid deployment operations in a mid- to high-threat environment. Working together,
however, each contributes essential services within what would be a far more advanced and effective capability. A multidimensional service offers a wider range of help and a more effective synergy.

**A UNEPS will be a multifunctional service**

UN experience in complex emergencies confirms the need to provide security while addressing human needs with essential services as promptly as possible. To attract broad support and respect, a UN service must be multifunctional – capable of diverse assignments – with specialized skills for dealing with conflict, security, humanitarian, health and environmental crises.

While the first objective of a UNEPS is to address immediate needs and operate as the first into, and the first out of, an operation, its reception will depend on the extent to which it establishes the groundwork for further efforts. Getting off to a good start early may also determine the prospects, size and expense of subsequent efforts.

With the wider range of emergency services available, the wider range of problems that may be addressed. A multi-functional service should be more appealing to a wider range of parties, in theatre and abroad. This should also increase its value and cost-effectiveness. Further, with the capacity to help in various missions, there is far less prospect of being idle or under-utilized.

**A UNEPS will be co-located at a designated UN base under an operational headquarters and two mobile mission headquarters**

If UN responses are to be rapid, there is a need for a dedicated facility from which to plan, prepare and deploy future operations. A UN base is the appropriate way to consolidate the personnel, equipment, and combined effort required.

A critical requirement, which should coincide with the development of the UN base, is the establishment of an expanded, static, operational-level headquarters. Together, this headquarters and base could serve as a focal point for recruitment, contingency planning, doctrinal development and the training of military, police and civilian elements. An example operational headquarters is outlined in Annex A.

The operational headquarters would be expected to ensure that two tactical-field headquarters (mission headquarters) were fully functional and capable of assuming operational control over one of the two formations of deployable elements. An example of the deployable elements, including the mission headquarters is outlined in Annex B.

**A UNEPS will be composed of 13,500 dedicated personnel**

Overall, a total of approximately 13,500 personnel would be required to ensure rapid and effective deployment to each of the four primary roles. The projected size, composition and modular formation allow deployments to be scaled up or down and tailored to address mission-specific requirements.

A UNEPS is to provide the UN with its own dedicated service, composed of individuals volunteering for UN service. People would be selected on the basis
of merit, advanced skills and dedication to the principles within the UN Charter. It should not be difficult to recruit sufficient people with the military, police and civilian skills, qualifications and dedication required. Those who volunteered and met the criteria would be directly employed by the UN, with a status similar to the UN Guards and UN Civil Servants.

The benefits of UN volunteers are understood. Clearly, this would help to offset the political pressure many contributing governments face when confronted with decisions about whether to participate in potentially high-risk operations.

As Canada’s study on UN rapid deployment noted, “UN volunteers offer the best prospect of a completely reliable, well-trained rapid reaction capability. Without the need to consult national authorities, the UN could cut response times significantly, and volunteers could be deployed within hours of a Security Council decision.” Ultimately, the report acknowledged, a UN rapid reaction capability can be truly reliable only if it no longer depends on Member States of the UN for the supply of personnel for peace operations.

**A UNEPS will be at sufficient strength to operate in high-threat environments**

With a higher incidence of conflicts that necessitate Chapter VII mandates, including robust rules of engagement, a UN Emergency Peace Service will require military credibility, as well as highly-developed police and civilian elements. As proposed, it is to be a robust, mobile, sophisticated capability sufficient to manage the start-up phase of demanding UN operations. Two brigade groups under two mission headquarters would be available. Each would have ample deterrent capacity. The deployable elements under each mobile mission headquarters correspond to the requirements for mission start-up of a demanding UN operation.

A UNEPS is no panacea or cure all. It is limited by size, design and purpose. Clearly, it is not for, nor capable of, war-fighting, mid-to-high intensity combat or largescale enforcement operations. But that should not foreclose on its prospect to help even with larger, demanding operations. As proposed, a UNEPS has sufficient capacity to deter substantive opposition and aggression, to manage protection operations and to help in securing safe havens, buffer zones and humanitarian corridors.

**A UNEPS would ensure regional and gender equitable representation**

A UNEPS is to be a cosmopolitan capacity. As such, it must be representative of ‘we the people’, drawing equitably from every region. To facilitate political approval and enhance legitimacy, the criteria for recruitment will emphasize broad geographical representation. Dedicated UN elements must be of a heterogeneous composition with no distinct national representation.

Similarly, a UNEPS is to ensure gender equity within all aspects of the service. Gender equity is a priority now mainstreamed in UN peace operations.

**A UNEPS is to complement existing UN and regional arrangements**

As proposed, a UNEPS is a first responder for the initial start-up period of demanding operations. It complements the current troop and police contributing
countries by providing the services required immediately in the three- to six-months before Member States are ready to contribute. A UNEPS will require an assurance of reliable follow-on support, rotations, augmentation or extraction. The existing regional arrangements and national contributors would remain essential to UN peace operations.

**A UNEPS would be cost-effective**

As noted, a UN Emergency Service composed of volunteers would inevitably entail major start-up and recurring costs. Given a full complement of 13,500 personnel, the start-up costs would likely be in the range of $3.5 billion (U.S.), with annual recurring costs of approximately $1.5 billion, and incremental costs for field operations of approximately $1.2 billion. These costs would likely be shared proportionally among 193 Member States as part of each nation’s assessed share of the UN regular budget.

It’s common sense: useful emergency services are the key to legitimate intervention; rapid deployment is essential to protecting civilians and reducing the need for late, larger and more costly efforts; a modest UN deterrent is one of the keys to preventing armed conflict, atrocity crimes and a culture of impunity; and, addressing human needs, particularly when help is most needed, may be critical to the prospect of a more cooperative future. Further, individuals recruited globally on the basis of merit and dedication to the UN, well-trained, equipped and paid by the UN into a cohesive UN formation are more likely to perform assigned UN tasks at a higher level of reliability, rapidity and effectiveness. A UNEPS would set a higher standard, complementing wider efforts to improve peace operations.

*We made at least a beginning then. If on that foundation, we do not build something more permanent and stronger, we will once again have ignored realities, rejected opportunities and betrayed our trust. Will we never learn? – The Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Nobel Peace Prize Address, Aula, Oslo, Norway, December 11, 1957.*
Annex A
Operational Level
UN Emergency Peace Service
Permanent Operational Level
Headquarters and Base
Personnel:
290 MIL
40 POL
1540 CIV
Annex B. **Composition of Deployable Elements for a UN Emergency Peace Service**

(assume 2 MHQ with 2 complete formations)

(assigned to UN Base under a Static Operational HQ and 2 Missions HQs)

Total Personnel in Each: MIL 5000, CIV 610, POL 400

- Deputy/SRSG
- Military & Police Commander
  - MIL 1 x 250 Pers
  - CIV 1 x 20 Pers
  - POL 1 x 20 Pers

**Mission HQ**
- MIL-4 x 50 Pers
  - Augmented by CIV
- POL-3 x 125 Pers

**Technical Receiv Unit**
- MIL-2 x 250 Pers

**Light Armoured Receiv Unit**
- MIL-2 x 150 Pers
- CIV-4 x 30 Per

**Motorized Light Infantry Battalion**
- MIL-2 x 600 Pers
- CIV-2 x 10 Per

**Amoured (Wheeled) Infantry Battalion**
- MIL-2 x 600 Pers
- CIV-4 x 10 Per
- MIL-450 Pers
- 2 flights of 8 utility Helis
- 1 flight of 3 Heavy Lift Helis
- 2 flights of Armed Scout Helis
- CIV-2 x 20 Per
- DDDRRR Team

**Helicopter Squadron**
- MIL-500 Pers
- 3 Field Squadrions
- 3 Support Troops
- CIV-10 Pers
- Environmental Crisis Response Team

**Engineer Battalion**
- MIL-1 x 500 Pers
- CIV-4 x 50 Per
- Medical & Health Teams

**Logistics Battalion**
- MIL-400 Pers
- Forward Surgical Teams
- CIV-4 x 5 Per
- Public Affairs

**Civilian Police Companies**
- CIV-4 x 10 Per

**Political and Legal Advice**
- CIV-4 x 10 Per

**Translation**
- CIV-4 x 10 Per

**Comms Signals**
- CIV-4 x 10 Per

**Intell Defense**
- CIV-4 x 10 Per

**Security Platoon**
- MIL-250 Pers

**NGO Liaison Team**
- MIL-250 Pers

Pertinent UNHQ includes:
- Military, Police and Civilian Staff
- Political and Legal Advice
- Translation/Comms/Signals Intell.
- Defense & Security Platoon
- NGO Liaison Team

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“We Need Peace, Now More Than Ever”…“Time to think big” – United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres.

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Citizens For Global Solutions
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